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Problem area 
Aircraft create wake vortices when 
taking off and landing, restricting 
runway capacity. These vortices 
usually dissipate quickly, but most 
airports opt for the safest scenario, 
which means the interval between 
aircraft taking off or landing often 
amounts to several minutes. A 
potential improvement of wake 
vortex safety is through installation 
/use of a Wake Vortex Detection, 
Warning and Avoidance (WV 
DWA) system on-board aircraft.  
 
Description of work 
The EC project I-Wake has 
designed an on-board wake vortex 
detection, warning and avoidance 
system for the flight crew, which 
helps to minimize the probability 
that an aircraft encounters a wake 
vortex. The I-Wake system is 
proposed as a safety net in support 
of ATC decided reduced separation. 
A single runway arrival procedure 
for aircraft equipped with a WV 
DWA system assumes that a missed 
approach is initiated after the flight 
crew receives an alert indicating 
that the aircraft will likely 
encounter a severe wake vortex. 
This study has quantified wake 
vortex induced risk through the use 
of the WAVIR methodology, 
extended with an aircraft/pilot 
missed approach model and a causal 
model for the WV DWA system 
failure probability. The assessment 
of wake induced risk levels for the 
approach phase when reduced 
aircraft separation is applied has 
been performed for different aircraft 
types and various wind conditions. 
Aspects considered are e.g. the time 
for caution and alert and the WV 
DWA system capabilities.  
 
Results and conclusions 
The use of a WV DWA system 
seems to reduce the wake vortex 
induced risk only slightly as 
compared to the current practice. 
The main reason for this is the fact 
that the largest risk during single 
runway arrivals occurs near the 
runway threshold. Therefore, WV 
DWA use would be most beneficial 
at low altitudes, where a rebounding 
wake might be present. Note that 
for wake vortex safety reasons 
initiation of a missed approach is 
not recommendable at low altitudes. 
 
Applicability 
Based on the above, the use of a 
WV DWA seems to have only 
minor impact on the wake vortex 
induced risk during single runway 
arrivals. A WV DWA system is 
mainly applicable as safety net in 
support of reduced separation. 
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Summary 
Aircraft create wake vortices when taking off and landing, restricting runway capacity. These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means the 
interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. A potential 
improvement of wake vortex safety is through installation and use of a wake vortex detection, 
warning, and avoidance system on-board aircraft.  
 
The EC project I-Wake has designed an on-board wake vortex detection, warning and avoidance 
system for the flight crew, which helps to minimize the probability that an aircraft encounters a 
wake vortex. The I-Wake system is proposed as a safety net in support of ATC decided reduced 
separation, intended for protection along the glide path from ILS/GS intercept. A single runway 
arrival procedure that is designed for aircraft equipped with a WV DWA system assumes that a 
missed approach is initiated after the flight crew receives an alert indicating that the aircraft will 
likely encounter a severe wake vortex. This study has quantified the wake vortex induced 
incident/ accident risk through the use of the WAVIR methodology, extended with an 
aircraft/pilot missed approach model and a causal model for the WV DWA system failure 
probability. The assessment of wake induced risk levels for the approach phase when reduced 
aircraft separation is applied has been performed for different aircraft types and various wind 
conditions. Aspects considered are e.g. the time for caution and alert and the WV DWA system 
capabilities (such as the horizontal and vertical scanning view, the angle of regard, the wake 
vortex detection range).  
 
The use of a WV DWA seems to reduce the wake vortex induced risk only slightly as compared 
to the current practice. The main reason for this is the fact that the largest risk during single 
runway arrivals occurs near the runway threshold. Therefore, WV DWA use would be most 
beneficial at low altitudes, where the probability of encountering a (rebounding) wake is 
highest. Note that for wake vortex safety reasons initiation of a missed approach is not 
recommendable at low altitudes. Based on the above, the operational use of a WV DWA seems 
to have only minor impact on the wake vortex induced risk during single runway arrivals. A 
WV DWA is mainly applicable as safety net in support of ATC decided reduced separation  
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Abbreviations 
ATC   Air Traffic Control 
ATC-WAKE  Integrated ATC Wake Vortex Safety and Capacity System (EU project) 
COP   Climb Out Point 
CRM   Collision Risk Manual 
DH   Decision Height 
DP   Deceleration Point 
DWA    Detection, Warning, and Avoidance 
EC   European Commission 
EDR   Eddy Dissipation Rate 
ERCR   Extended Roll Control Ratio 
FAC   Follower Aircraft 
FAP   Final Approach Point 
FAS   Final Approach Speed 
FHA   Functional Hazard Assessment 
GS   Glide Slope 
GUI   Graphical User Interface 
ICAO   International Civil Aviation Organization 
IF   Intermediate Fix 
ILS   Instrument Landing System 
I-WAKE  Instrumentation for on-board wake vortex DWA (EU project) 
LAC   Leader Aircraft 
LiDAR   Light Detection and Ranging 
ND   Navigation Display 
NLR   Netherlands National Aerospace Laboratory  
NM   Nautical Mile 
OM   Outer Marker 
PFD   Primary Flight Display 
RAPM   Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model 
RDH   Reference Datum Height 
TAS   True Air Speed 
THR   Runway Threshold 
UK MO  United Kingdom Meteorological Office 
WAVIR  Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment methodology 
WV   Wake Vortex 
  
NLR-TP-2006-532 
 
  7 
 
1 Introduction 
Aircraft create wake vortices when taking off and landing, restricting runway capacity. These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means the 
interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. The EC project 
I-Wake has designed an on-board wake vortex detection, warning and avoidance system for the 
flight crew, which helps to minimize the probability that an aircraft encounters a wake vortex.  
The I-Wake system is proposed as a safety net in support of ATC decided reduced separation, 
intended for protection along the glide path from ILS/GS intercept [10]. An I-Wake system 
could be useful as safety net in case reduced separation is applied, e.g. through use of ATC-
Wake with reduced wake vortex separation in case of crosswind [8, 9, 10]. 
 
The main objective of this study is to provide the I-Wake system with an assessment of wake 
induced risk levels for the approach phase when reduced aircraft separation (2.0 or 2.5 NM 
between all aircraft) is applied. Such analysis will be performed for different aircraft types and 
various wind conditions for reduced separation. Although it is foreseen to use I-Wake as safety 
net in combination with ATC decided reduced separation [10], this study assumes that a WV 
DWA is used as a standalone system. A specific objective is to support the setting of 
requirements for the use of a WV DWA. Aspects to be considered are e.g. the time for caution 
and alert and WV DWA system capabilities (such as the horizontal and vertical scanning view, 
the angle of regard, the wake vortex detection range) and the initiation of a missed approach. 
 
For a quantitative assessment of the wake vortex induced risk related to a WV DWA single 
runway arrival procedure with reduced separation, there are three main issues to consider: 
 If one or more WV DWA system components provide a wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might be 
catastrophic, in case reduced aircraft separation (e.g. 2.0. or 2.5 NM) is applied. 
 The pilot has to initiate a wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case an WV DWA 
warning/alert is raised. Usually, the pilot will initiate a missed approach and/or turn away 
from the wake vortices detected by the WV DWA system on-board the aircraft. 
 The separation distance between leader and follower varies along the approach, and after 
missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and follower increases. 
 
Section 2 describes the WV DWA single runway arrival procedure, for which an assessment of 
wake vortex induced risk levels will be provided. Section 3 describes the risk assessment 
methodology, which is based on integration of the ‘classical’ WAVIR methodology with a 
missed approach model and a causal model for the WV DWA system failure probability. The 
simulation scenarios are specified in Section 4. Risk assessment results are presented and 
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides the conclusions and recommendations. 
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2 I-Wake system and main functionalities 
The primary purpose of the I-Wake system is to minimise the probability that an aircraft 
encounters a wake vortex. The system has a tactical and a strategic function. The tactical Wake 
Vortex Detection, Warning and Avoidance (WV DWA) function is to provide a caution and/or 
alert to the flight crew for impending encounters (e.g. within 30 seconds) with hazardous wakes. 
This is achieved by recognising atmospheric disturbance patterns for wake vortices using 
onboard sensors. The crew is alerted by both visual and aural cues when a wake hazard is 
detected. The strategic WV DWA function is to increase the flight crew’s situational awareness 
of local wake hazards. Hazards are predicted and their severity estimated with a mathematical 
model on-board aircraft. This model uses current weather data, actual aircraft positions and 
aircraft characteristics such as weight and wingspan of surrounding aircraft. Information about 
possible wake hazards is displayed on the navigation display in the cockpit (see Figure 2-1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1  Schematic representation of the main functions of the WV DWA system 
A schematic representation of the tactical WV DWA function is shown in Figure 2-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2  Schematic representation of the tactical wake vortex DWA function 
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The fundamental part of the wake vortex detection within the tactical function is a sensor that 
physically and independently measures disturbances in the atmosphere. The sensor for wake 
vortex detection will be a pulsed Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) system, fixed to the 
lower part of the fuselage at the front of the aircraft. The initial I-Wake system design proposes 
a LiDAR detection range for wake vortex induced atmospheric disturbances between 800 and 
2400 meters. The LiDAR will scan a volume of air in front of the aircraft with an adjustable 
angle of regard. The field of view of the scanning is proposed to be about 6° wide and about 
1.5° high. The signals received from the sensor are processed to determine if there is a possible 
wake vortex within the scanning volume. This process uses attitude and airspeed information 
from the own aircraft. The strength of a wake vortex will be estimated. Fifteen seconds or less 
prior to encountering a severe wake (i.e. a wake that exceeds the predetermined warning 
severity threshold) the flight crew will receive a visual and an aural WARNING alert. The 
visual warning will be displayed on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The initial I-Wake 
system design proposes that a CAUTION alert will be provided between 15 and 30 seconds 
before encountering a wake vortex that has an estimated strength that is in excess of a 
predetermined caution threshold. CAUTION alerts are also given both visually (on the PFD) 
and aurally by a synthetic voice. Alerts can be cancelled or inhibited on the master warning 
panel. A schematic representation of the strategic WV DWA function is shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3  Schematic representation of the strategic wake vortex DWA function 
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3 Risk assessment methodology 
3.1 General approach 
This Section provides the risk assessment methodology for assessment of wake induced risk 
levels for the WV DWA single runway arrival operation with reduced aircraft separation (2.0 or 
2.5 NM between all aircraft) is applied. Such analysis will be performed for different aircraft 
types and various wind conditions for reduced separation. A further objective is to support the 
setting of requirements for the I-Wake system Aspects to be considered are e.g. the time for 
caution and alert, the horizontal and vertical scanning view, the angle of regard, the wake vortex 
detection range and the minimum wake vortex severity threshold for initiation of a missed 
approach. For a quantitative assessment of the wake vortex induced risk related to the WV 
DWA single runway arrival operation with reduced separation, there are three main issues to 
consider: 
 If one or more WV DWA system components provide a wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might be 
CATASTROPHIC, in case reduced aircraft separation (e.g. 2.0. or 2.5 NM) is applied. 
 The pilot has to initiate a wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case an WV DWA 
warning/ alert is raised. Usually, the pilot will initiate a missed approach and/or turn away 
from the wake vortices detected by the WV DWA system on-board the aircraft. 
 The separation distance between leader and follower varies along the approach, and after 
missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and follower increases.  
 
The risk assessment methodology will integrate the ‘classical’ WAVIR methodology with a 
missed approach model and a causal model for the WV DWA system failure probability. The 
'classical' WAVIR methodology, which originates from S-Wake [1, 2, 7], is used to assess wake 
vortex induced risk in the case of a failure of one or more of the I-Wake system components. In 
this case, no wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre is performed by the aircraft/pilot and a ‘worst 
case’ assessment of the incident/accident risk is obtained.  
 
3.2 Wake vortex detection, warning, and avoidance probability 
De Jong et al. [3] provides a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) of the WV DWA system 
used in conjunction with a ground based ATC-Wake system [8, 9] during the approach phase of 
flight. The FHA revealed a number of possible consequences of (failures) of a DWA system: 
 Unexpected encounter of a wake vortex; 
 Attempt to operate at the edge of safety; 
 Crew confusion; 
 Initiation of an unnecessary evasive action; 
 Incorrect crew awareness of wake vortex hazards; 
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 Crew disregarding the wake vortex DWA system. 
Of these possible consequences, the only event classified as major (with a potentially even more 
severe consequence in case of a very small aircraft flying at low altitude behind a large aircraft) 
is the “unexpected encounter of a wake vortex” (the other events would either have no or minor 
immediate impact on safety. The "unexpected encounter of a wake vortex" will therefore be 
used as basis for the construction of a causal model to assess the on-board WV DWA failure 
probability. The core of this causal model is based on a failure of one or more of the WV DWA 
system components, including the performance of the on-board LiDAR system itself (field of 
view, angle of regard, detection distance). The resulting causal model, explaining the 
dependencies between the main influencing factors, is sketched in Figure 3-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1  Causal model for the I-Wake system/operation 
 
The nodes in this causal model have the following explanation: 
− I-Wake DWA Failure (11): represents the probability distribution of aircraft/pilot not able to 
perform the I-Wake detection, warning and avoidance manoeuvre when required. 
− Aircraft/Pilot not able to initiate missed approach (10): represents the probability of an 
aircraft/pilot not able to initiate an evasive action (missed approach) when needed. 
− I-Wake Monitoring and Alerting Failure (9): represents the probability of not providing a 
timely warning to the flight crew when one should be given. As a result, no evasive action 
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is possible and the pilot reacts later to a wake encounter when one should occur. 
− Loss of WV DWA Tactical Function (8): represents the probability of loss of the WV DWA 
tactical function. There are 2 possibilities: 1) detected loss: crew is aware (there is a clear 
indication of DWA function loss) and the pilot will likely increase separation, and 2) 
undetected loss: crew is not aware (there is no clear indication of DWA function loss). 
− Improper Model Prediction (7): represents the probability that the predictions of Wake 
Vortex locations and strength, as used in the I-Wake system, are inaccurate/wrong. 
− Faulty/Inaccurate Aircraft Data (6): represents the probability that the aircraft data, as used 
in the I-Wake system, is inaccurate/wrong. As a result, incorrect information is used, 
causing improper functioning of the I-Wake system. 
− Inaccurate or Faulty WV Model Estimation (5): represents the probability that the WV 
model locations and/or strengths predictions, as used in the I-Wake system, are wrong/ 
inaccurate. As a result, incorrect information is used, causing improper functioning. 
− Inaccurate or Faulty Meteo Nowcasting (4): represents the probability that the 
meteorological nowcasting data, as used in the I-Wake system, is inaccurate or wrong. As a 
result, incorrect information is used, causing improper functioning of the I-Wake system. 
− Improper Detector Performance (3): represents the probability that the on-board WV 
detection system (LiDAR) performs significantly less than the flight crew expects (while 
they are not aware of the inaccuracies). As a result wrong (or even no) alerts are given. 
− Wake Vortex Outside Detection Range/Scanning Volume (2): represents the probability that 
the on-board WV detection system (LiDAR) does not detect the wake vortices of the 
leading aircraft, because these are outside the scanning volume of air ahead of the aircraft. 
− Inaccurate or Faulty Detection of Wake Vortices (1): represents the probability that the on-
board WV detection system (LiDAR) does not detect wake vortices of the leading aircraft, 
when these are inside the planned scanning volume of air ahead of the aircraft. 
 
3.3 Aircraft flight trajectory model 
The aircraft intercept their localizer at the Intermediate Fix (IF). From the IF, the aircraft are 
expected to fly along runway direction. During intermediate approach the flight trajectory is 
kept horizontal. From the Final Approach Point (FAP), an aircraft descends with a glide path 
angle of about 3°. Several reasons may cause an aircraft to initiate a missed approach at any 
altitude between the FAP and Decision Height (DH). The WV DWA single runway arrival 
operation assumes that prior to encountering a severe wake, the flight crew will receive an I-
Wake warning/alert, after which the pilot may decide to initiate a missed approach. The purpose 
of such manoeuvre is to increase the vertical distance between (severe) wake vortices generated 
by the leader aircraft and the follower, thereby minimizing the probability that an aircraft 
encounters a wake vortex. The missed approach path consists of a curved part and a climb out 
part. From the Climb Out Point (COP), the aircraft climb under a constant climb out gradient. 
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Important are the determination of the (maximum) altitude loss during the curved part of a 
missed approach and the time needed from initiation of a missed approach to the COP. 
Initiation of the missed approach involves execution of several tasks by the crew, during which 
the aircraft first loses height and then as a consequence of adjustments of the flight controls 
attains an ascending trajectory. The height loss (and gained) during a missed approach is 
determined with a model based on the dynamic relation between the flight path angle γ  and the 
pitch angle θ . This dynamic relation can be expressed as the following transfer function [4]: 
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        (3-1) 
where g is the gravitational acceleration and ν is the True Air Speed (TAS) of the aircraft. The 
normal acceleration sensitivity, nα , is defined as the "steady state normal acceleration change 
per unit change in angle-of-attack at constant air speed" [4]. It can be approximated by: 
 
L
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where CLα  is the lift curve slope and CL is the lift coefficient. During rectalinear flight, the latter 
is equal to:  
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where ρ  is the air density, m is the mass, and S is the wing area of the aircraft. 
 
The pitch angle θ  depends on the elevator deflection δe  , according to the following transfer 
function (constant speed, short period approximation) [5]: 
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where ω  and ζ  are the short period frequency and the damping coefficient in the dynamic 
missed approach model respectively. Other new parameters are the pilot (pitch) gain (KQ), static 
margin (MS ), dimensionless inertial radius (IR ), and the mean aerodynamic chord ( c ). 
 
The time needed to adapt the initial pitch angle (θMAP ) to final pitch angle (θCOP ) is estimated by 
 
q
T MAPCOPcurveMA
θθ −
=
  
        (3-5) 
where the commanded pitch rate (q) is assumed constant during the full curved part of the 
missed approach. This formula can also be used to estimate the distance flown until the COP. 
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3.4 Risk assessment model and toolset 
Define talert  and tcaution  as the time of alert and the time of caution for a potential wake vortex 
hazard respectively. The associated positions along the flight track are denoted by xalert   and 
xcaution . The LiDAR detection distance is specified by ]  x,  [ maxmin DETDETx , where DETxmin denotes the 
minimum detection distance and DETmaxx  denotes the maximum detection distance. Define the I-
Wake system detection capabilities further via the following three parameters: 
 yFOV  LiDAR horizontal field of view; 
 zFOV  LiDAR vertical field of view; 
 ZAOR  LiDAR angle of regard. 
 
In the detection phase, where ]  x,  x[ maxminit DETDETx∈  and an alert may be provided on the basis of 
wake detection information, the 'scan window'  is determined via the position of the aircraft and 
the I-Wake system detection capabilities. In the prediction phase, where a caution may need to 
be provided, there is some uncertainty because no actual wake vortex detection information is 
available. It is assumed that this uncertainty is dealt with by defining a 'caution bounding box' 
as a percentage (larger than 100%) of the size of the scan window at t = talert .  
 
Due to potential failure conditions of the I-Wake system components, it can not be assumed that 
the I-Wake system will always be functioning. Define the failure probabilities for the I-Wake 
subsystem components as constants, which are specified by setting requirements for the 
maximum allowable failure probabilities to be verified during the I-Wake system life cycle. 
 PFAD  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) aircraft data 
 PFWV  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) wake vortex model estimation 
 PFNC  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) meteorological now-casting data 
 PFD  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) detection of wake vortices 
 PLTF  Failure probability for loss of the overall wake vortex DWA tactical function 
 
Assume now that the caution procedure is operational in case: 
• The correct Aircraft Data is used (i.e. PFAD = 0 ); 
• The Wake Vortex Model Estimation is correct (i.e. PFWV = 0 ); 
• The Meteorological Now-casting system is working correctly (i.e. PFNC = 0 ). 
 
Assume furthermore that the alerting procedure is operational in case: 
• The on-board LiDAR detection system is working correctly (i.e. PFD  = 0 ); 
• There is no loss of the overall wake vortex DWA function (i.e. PLTF = 0 ); 
• The wake vortex is inside the scanning volume of the on-board LiDAR system. 
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It is assumed that the pilot reaction time, in case of an alert, depends on the fact whether or not a 
caution has been given. In case of a previous caution, the pilot will react quicker to an alert. 
After an alert, the pilot may decide to initiate a missed approach, but only in case the actual 
height of the aircraft is above the Decision Height (DH). The pilot may also decide not to 
initiate a missed approach depending on e.g. the prediction of the wake vortex strength. 
 
The WV DWA single runway arrival operation to be followed implies the following: 
1. If the follower aircraft position is predicted to be within the wake vortex bounding box of 
(at least one of) the vortices and the caution procedure is operational, a caution is given. 
2. If the follower aircraft detects a wake vortex (i.e. at least one of the vortices is within the 
LiDAR scanning volume) and the alerting procedure is operational, an alert is given.  
3. If an alert is given and the aircraft is above DH, a missed approach may be initiated. The 
reaction time of the pilot depends on the fact whether or not a caution has been given.  
4. If a missed approach is initiated, the aircraft first loses height and then as a consequence of 
adjustments of the flight controls attains an ascending trajectory. The height loss (and 
gained) is determined with the missed approach model described in detail in section 3.3. 
 
The risk assessment model is integrated within the NLR WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment 
(WAVIR) toolset. Figure 3-2 provides a result from the execution of the VORTICES module. 
The scanning window is used to estimate the probability of an alert and a missed approach. 
 
Figure 3-2  Simulated wake vortex positions and strengths, 90 % confidence interval about the 
aircraft position (circle) and scanning window at the gate where alert should be given 
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Figure 3-3 shows the WAVIR Graphical User Interface (GUI) dedicated to the specification of 
the parameters for the assessment of the WV DWA single runway arrival operation. The LiDAR 
detection system parameter setting (and the continuous update thereof) is shown in the Figure in 
the top-right of the GUI. Note that other parameter settings (e.g. for the VORTICES, the 
ENCOUNTER, and the RISK PREDICTION modules) are specified in other GUIs, which are 
not described in detail this study (an up-to-date WAVIR User Manual is available via NLR). 
 
 
Figure 3-3  WAVIR Graphical User Interface for the specification of I-Wake parameters 
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4 Description of scenarios 
4.1 General description 
I-Wake aims at final approach operations with separation distances below current ICAO wake 
turbulence radar separation minima in favourable weather conditions. It is an aim of the current 
study to determine conditions under which reduced wake vortex separation of 2.5 NM (or even 
2.0 NM) is feasible in terms of acceptable wake vortex risk and acceptable missed approach 
rate. These conditions imply the setting of requirements for the I-Wake system and operation. 
This will be done on the basis of final approach scenarios for the combination of a large jumbo 
jet followed by a medium jet, regional jet, and a medium turbo prop. The identification of 
conditions under which 2.5 NM (or even 2.0 NM) minimum separation may be feasible is based 
on a sensitivity analysis for selected assessment parameters in the model of the WV DWA 
single runway arrival operation. The generic scenario considers the final approach of a leader 
and follower aircraft, both descending along the ILS path from Final Approach Point (FAP) to 
Runway Threshold (THR). A missed approach is only initiated after the I-Wake system detects 
a potentially dangerous wake vortex, and can be initiated at any height above 200 ft. 
 
4.2 Set up of the simulation scenarios 
The set up and results of the quantitative risk assessment of the I-Wake operation are obtained 
using the quantitative risk assessment methodology described in Section 3. The assessments 
have been performed for the situation without the use of an I-Wake system, and also for the 
proposed I-Wake operation. Basically, the focus is on the setting of the requirements for the I-
Wake system. Therefore, the scenarios differ in the 'assessment parameters' listed in Table 4-1. 
In total, 24 scenarios have been assessed. Three different follower aircraft are considered: a 
Medium Jet (FAC 3), a Regional Jet (FAC 4), and a Medium Turbo Prop (FAC 5). A Large 
Jumbo Jet (LAC 1) is simulated as wake vortex generator aircraft. Separation distances of 2.0, 
2.5, 3.0, and 4.0 NM (between all aircraft) have been considered. The crosswind is varied 
between values of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 m/s (measured at 10 m altitude with no head- or tailwind). 
 
The aircraft are assumed to follow a 3 degrees glide path from ILS glide path intercept to 
touchdown. The glide path intercepts the runway 300 m beyond the runway threshold 
(corresponding to a Reference Datum Height (RDH) of 52 ft). From previous quantitative 
studies for single runway arrivals, it appeared that the risk is highest close to the runway 
threshold, i.e. close to the ground. It is expected that this will also be the case for the I-Wake 
operation and it is therefore that the safety assessment will focus on the last 4 NM of the 
approach. A simulation scenario is further defined by all the parameters and variables in the 
WAVIR toolset (including the extension with the missed approach model from Section 3.3). 
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Table 4-1  Assessment Parameter Matrix (1) 
Scenario LAC FAC Vert. Angle Lat. Angle Angle of Regard Detection distance Time of Alert Failure probabilities Bounding box
1 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
2 1 3 3.0 6.0 0 400 - 2400 10 0.001 100
3 1 3 1.5 3.0 -1.5 200 - 2400 7 0.001 100
4 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 3200 20 0.001 100
5 1 3 3.0 3.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
6 1 3 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
7 1 3 3.0 6.0 -1.5 200 - 3200 7 0.001 100
8 1 3 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 20 0.001 100
9 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 150
10 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 200
11 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 Nil 100
12 1 3 3.0 12.0 -3.0 800 - 4800 15 Nil 100
13 1 4 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
14 1 4 1.5 6.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.001 100
15 1 4 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
16 1 4 3.0 12.0 -3.0 800 - 4800 15 0.001 150
17 1 4 3.0 12.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.01 150
18 1 4 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.1 100
19 1 5 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
20 1 5 1.5 6.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.001 100
21 1 5 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
22 1 5 3.0 12.0 -3.0 800 - 4800 15 0.001 150
23 1 5 3.0 12.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.01 150
24 1 5 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.1 100
 
 
As mentioned before, the aircraft are planned to follow a 3 degrees glide path from ILS glide 
path intercept to touchdown. The lateral and vertical deviation from the nominal flight path is 
based on the ICAO-CRM. Nominal aircraft speed profiles are specified by (see Figure 4-1): 
 the airport dependent speed at the Outer Marker (OM) that is prescribed by ATC; 
 from OM to the Deceleration Point (DP), the speed is linearly decreasing to the aircraft 
dependent Final Approach Speed (FAS); 
 from DP until touchdown, aircraft dependent speed is constant and equal to the FAS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1  Nominal approach speed profiles 
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Analysis of wake vortex induced risk is done in the longitudinal positions listed in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2  Longitudinal and corresponding vertical nominal positions for arrivals 
Longitudinal positions for the arrival operation
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
x [m] 0 -300 -900 -2000 -3000 -4000 -5000 -6000 -7408 -10000
[NM] 0,0 -0,2 -0,5 -1,1 -1,6 -2,2 -2,7 -3,2 -4,0 -5,4
Vertical positions for the arrival operation
z [m] 16 31 63 121 173 225 278 330 404 540
[ft] 52 103 206 395 567 739 911 1083 1325 1771
 
 
Initiation and execution of a missed approach 
The I-Wake operation is based on the initiation of a missed approach in case an I-Wake 
warning/alert is raised. After missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and 
follower increases (note that a missed approach is not feasible at altitudes below 200 ft). 
 
Table 4-3  Aircraft and missed approach parameters 
 Light 
Turbo 
Prop 
Medium 
Turbo 
Prop 
Regional 
Jet 
Medium 
Jet 
Wide 
Body 
Jet 
Large 
Jumbo 
Jet 
Mass 4000 20000 34000 60000 130000 245000 
Wingspan 16 30 30 36 45 60 
Root chord 3.70 3.40 5.00 6.50 11.40 17.00 
Tip chord 0 0 0 0 2.70 0 
Wing Area 29.60 51 75 117 317.25 510 
Mean Aero Chord 1.85 1.70 2.50 3.25 7.05 8.50 
Initial pitch angle -1 -1 0 2 2 3 
Final pitch angle 15 15 15 18 18 18 
Pitch rate  2 2 2 2 2 2 
Lift curve slope 5.5 6 5.7 5.7 5.0 5.9 
Static margin 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Inertial pitching moment 24000 330000 1700000 3000000 10530000 42000000 
Inertial radius 1.324 2.389 2.828 2.176 1.277 1.540 
 
Pilot reaction time 
It is assumed that the pilot initiates a missed approach after receiving a WARNING alert from 
the I-Wake system. No action will be taken by the pilot after receiving a CAUTION alert. The 
reaction time of the pilot on a WARNING alert, leading to initiation of a missed approach, is 
2 seconds in case a prior CAUTION was given and 3 seconds in case no CAUTION is given. 
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Fixed and actual separation 
The separation is assumed to be fixed at the runway threshold. Separation distances of 2.0, 2.5, 
3.0, and 4.0 NM will be evaluated (this separation applies to all aircraft combinations). Due to 
differences in speed profiles, actual separation along the flight path will vary.  
 
Wake vortex evolution model parameters 
The vortex pair behind the generator aircraft is modelled as two line vortices with a vortex 
spacing, a vortex strength, and a core-radius. These parameters do depend on the wingspan, 
weight and speed of the generator aircraft. Evolution of the vortex position is modelled 
according to Corjon & Poinsot. This includes image vortices and secondary vortices making the 
vortex pair to diverge and rebound near the ground respectively. Parameters concerning 
secondary vortices are:  
 strength of the secondary vortices as a fraction of the strength of the primary vortices; and 
 rebound height 
A secondary vortex appears as soon as the primary vortex has decreased to a certain altitude: the 
rebound height. For the rebound height a fixed value of 0.6×b0 will be used, where b0  (= dyi ) is 
the wingspan of aircraft i. The strength of the secondary vortex is a fraction of the strength of 
the primary vortex. This fraction is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.3 and 0.7.  
 
Meteorological input parameters 
• Brunt-Väisälä frequency (N) 
• Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) 
Simulations have been performed for a two-dimensional data set of Brunt-Väisälä frequencies 
and EDR values representing the climatology of London Heathrow at different height levels. 
Information on this climatology was provided by UK Meteorological Office (UK MO). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2  Frequency distributions for the London Heathrow climatology 
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Decay model 
The decay function as defined by Sarpkaya will be used. Input parameters are the Brunt-Väisälä 
frequency N and the Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR).  
 
Wind input parameters 
 Wind velocity   
 Altitude of measurement 
 Roughness coefficient  
Wind will be simulated assuming a logarithmic wind profile up to an altitude of 1000ft. Above 
this altitude the wind is constant. The surface roughness is 0.03 m which is representative for an 
airport environment. The wind value is specified at 10 m altitude. In this study , it is assumed that 
there is no head- or tailwind (i.e. only the crosswind velocity is specified).  
 
Wake encounter model parameters 
Two encounter models are available, the Extended Roll Control Ratio model (ERCR) and the 
Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM) [7]. The aircraft dependent parameters that are required 
by the ERCR and RAPM model are determined for a number of generic aircraft types. In the 
current study, the ERCR has been applied to compute the roll control ratio and the maximum 
bank angle. The RAPM was used to verify and calibrate the ERCR model.  
 
WV DWA causal model parameters 
The following failure probabilities for the nodes in causal model are to be specified: 
− Inaccurate or faulty aircraft data 
− Inaccurate or faulty wake vortex model estimation 
− Inaccurate or faulty meteorological now-casting data 
− Inaccurate or faulty detection of wake vortices 
− Loss of overall wake vortex DWA tactical function 
In this study, it is mostly assumed that all the failure probabilities are equal to 10-4, though 
values like 10-2 or even 10-1 are also considered. A more detailed analysis of the impact of these 
failure probabilities on the overall I-Wake Detection, Warning, and Avoidance probability is 
provided in Angeles Morales [6]. 
 
Risk prediction model parameters 
To obtain incident/accident probabilities for a given time separation between leader and 
follower aircraft, the risk prediction model developed within S-Wake is used. This model 
includes a definition of risk events (Minor Incident, Major Incident, Hazardous Accident and 
Catastrophic Accident), a probability transition matrix from encounter severity classes to risk 
events, and the associated risk requirements (Target Level of Safety). 
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5 Risk assessment 
5.1 Overview of the risk assessment results 
Sections 5-2 - 5.5 present the risk assessment results for each of the 24 scenarios defined in 
Table 4-1. To analyse the impact of the assessment parameters and to assess the lowest possible 
risk achievable for a WV DWA single runway arrival operation, it is firstly assumed that missed 
approaches may be initiated at any height. This provides a best possible estimate for the lowest 
risk achievable with a WV DWA system. Results for the case where missed approaches are not 
initiated below 200 ft are discussed later on in section 5.6. 
 
Risk assessment results for a Medium Jet landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet under crosswind 
conditions of 0, 1, 2, and 3 m/s (with no head- or tailwind) are provided in Figures 5-1 until 5-4. 
Separation distances of 2, 2.5, 3, and 4 NM, with different crosswind conditions, are evaluated. 
Results without a WV DWA system are provided in grey, whereas the colours provide the 
incident/accident risk estimates in case a WV DWA system is used. Note that the scenario (in 
accordance with Table 4-1) is indicated on the horizontal axis. Figures 5-5 and 5-6 provide the 
incident/accident risk estimates, under different crosswind conditions, for a Medium Jet behind 
a Large Jumbo Jet with 2 and 2.5 NM separation distance respectively. The incident/accident 
risk estimates for a Regional Jet (scenarios 13 – 18) and a Medium Turbo Prop (scenarios 19 – 
24), both approaching and landing with 2 and 2.5 NM separation behind a Large Jumbo Jet, are 
provided in Figures 5-7 and 5-8 respectively. 
 
The intermediate results of the above incident/accident risk assessments (for the case where 
missed approaches are initiated at any height) are discussed in Section 5.5. It is important to 
realize that after timely detection of a dangerous wake vortex, the pilot may initiate a missed 
approach. However, one should realize that a missed approach is usually not appreciated from a 
capacity point of view as the aircraft will have to approach the airport once more. Therefore, a 
requirement might need to be set on the maximum allowable missed approach rate (e.g. 0.01 or 
0.001), for example by only issuing a warning in case the vortex strength exceeds a certain 
threshold. Such threshold can be placed on e.g. the vortex strength, the roll control ratio, or the 
maximum attained bank angle. The relation between these factors is estimated using the 
Extended Roll Control Ratio (ERCR) model.  
 
The impact of not initiating a missed approach below the Decision Height (usually 200 ft) on 
the lowest achievable wake vortex induced incident/accident risk is analysed also in section 5.5. 
This provide a more realistic and achievable estimate for the achievable lowest risk, as it is also 
clear that for wake vortex safety reasons a missed approach initiation is not recommendable at 
low altitudes.  
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5.2 Wake vortex induced risk for different crosswind conditions 
 
 
Figure 5-1  Risk in case of 0 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1-12 
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Figure 5-2  Risk in case of 1 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 5-3  Risk in case of 2 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 5-4  Risk in case of 3 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1 - 12 
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5.3 Wake vortex induced risk with reduced aircraft separation 
 
 
Figure 5-5  Risk in case of 2 NM separation for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 5-6  Risk in case of 2.5 NM separation for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 5-7  Risk in case of 2 NM separation for scenarios 13 - 24 
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Figure 5-8  Risk in case of 2.5 NM separation for scenarios 13 - 24 
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5.4 Initial estimate of the minimum required aircraft separation distances 
An initial estimate for the minimum required separation distances for a Medium Jet landing 
behind a Large Jumbo Jet is given in Figure 5-9. An initial estimate for the minimum required 
separation distances for a Regional Jet (scenarios 13 – 18) and a Medium Turbo Prop (scenarios 
19 – 24), both landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet, is given in Figure 5-10.Note that the coloured 
bars denote the crosswind (at 10 m altitude). Results without I-Wake are provided in grey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-9  Minimum required separation distances with I-Wake (scenarios 1 - 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-10  Minimum required separation distances with I-Wake (scenarios 13 - 24) 
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5.5 Discussion of the initial results 
The incident/accident risk assessment results provided in the previous sub-sections lead to the 
following observations: 
• There is almost no decrease in risk in scenarios 3 and 7, due to small alerting time of 7 
seconds. This implies that about 15 seconds is indeed preferred as I-Wake time of alert. 
• There is a large decrease in scenario 12 risk, due to the large lateral angle of the I-Wake 
detection system. This implies that a wide lateral angular view is very beneficial. 
• Reducing the failure probabilities of the I-Wake system components further than 10-4 (e.g. 
compare scenario 11 with scenario 1) has almost no effect. Apparently it suffices to design 
the I-Wake system components such that a maximum failure probability of 10-4 is achieved.  
• When comparing scenarios 13 - 18, the largest risk decrease occurs in scenario 16. Again 
this is most likely due to the large lateral angle. Note that the same angle is used in scenario 
17, but here in combination with an alerting time of 7 seconds, which – apparently – is too 
low for timely wake avoidance. The same holds for scenario 23 as compared to scenario 22.  
• The detection probabilities are relatively high near the threshold and lower further away 
from the threshold. Note that high detection probabilities will certainly imply high missed 
approach frequencies which are unacceptable from an airport efficiency point of view. 
• Scenarios 1 to 12 (Medium Jet landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet) would need to provide 
the same results, when looking at the results without using the I-Wake system. The variation 
in the grey symbols therefore represents the uncertainty inherent to WAVIR calculations. 
 
WAVIR assessed safe separation distances when using I-Wake system never exceed the results 
without using I-Wake. The largest reduction is observed in: 
• Scenario 6. This is probably due to the combination of angle of regard (-3 degrees) and 
lateral angle (6 degrees) resulting in a risk reduction also further away from the threshold. 
• Scenario 8. This is probably due to the combination of angle of regard (-3 degrees) and 
lateral angle (6 degrees ) resulting in a risk reduction also further away from the threshold 
as well as a alerting time of 20 seconds which provides more time to avoid the vortices. 
• Scenario 12. This is due to the large lateral detection angle (12 degrees). 
• Scenario 16. This is due to the large lateral detection angle (12 degrees). 
• Scenario 22. This is due to the large lateral detection angle (12 degrees). 
 
Aspects to be considered for the setting of requirements for the WV DWA single runway arrival 
operation are, besides the minimum crosswind for reduced separation, e.g. the time for caution 
and alert, the horizontal and vertical scanning view, angle of regard, wake vortex detection 
range and the minimum wake vortex severity threshold for initiation of a missed approach. 
However, before these aspects can be dealt with, a second assessment is made in order to 
analyse the impact of not initiating a missed approach below 200 ft. This is discussed next. 
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5.6 Refined assessment and discussion of results 
 
In a second, refined, assessment the parameters in Table 5-1 have been chosen such that the I-
Wake system capabilities provide the lowest risk without setting un-realistic and non-achievable 
requirements on the I-Wake system development. It is also assumed that a missed approach is 
not initiated below the Decision Height of 200 ft. 
 
Table 5-1  Assessment parameter matrix (2) 
Scenario LAC FAC Vert. Angle
Lat. 
Angle
Angle of 
Regard
Detection 
distance
Time of 
Alert
Failure 
probabilities
Bounding 
box
Vortex 
threshold
25 1 3 1.5 12.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100 70
26 1 4 1.5 12.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100 40
27 1 5 1.5 12.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100 30
 
 
Figure 5-11 presents an initial estimate for the minimum required separation distances for a 
Medium Jet, Regional Jet, and a Medium Turbo Prop (all landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet), in 
case this optimal I-Wake setting is used. Note that the coloured bars denote the crosswind (at 10 
m altitude). Results without I-Wake are provided in grey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11  Minimum required separation distances with optimal I-Wake system setting 
 
A comparison of Figure 5-11 with Figures 5-9 and 5-10 shows the major impact of not initiating 
a missed approach below the Decision height of 200 ft. In fact, the use of a WV DWA seems to 
reduce the wake vortex induced risk only slightly as compared to the current practice. The main 
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reason for this is the fact that the largest risk during single runway arrivals occurs near the 
runway threshold [1, 2, 7]. Therefore, WV DWA use would be most beneficial at low altitudes, 
where the probability of encountering a (rebounding) wake is highest. Unfortunately, for safety 
reasons initiation of a missed approach is not recommendable at low altitudes. Therefore, the 
operational use of a WV DWA seems to have only minor impact on the wake vortex induced 
risk during single runway arrivals. This confirms that a WV DWA system is mainly applicable 
as safety net in support of ATC decided reduced separation (in line with its intended use).  
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Aircraft create wake vortices when taking off and landing, restricting runway capacity. These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means the 
interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. The EC project 
I-Wake has designed an on-board wake vortex detection, warning and avoidance system for the 
flight crew, which helps to minimize the probability that an aircraft encounters a wake vortex.  
An I-Wake system, which is intended for protection along the glide path from ILS/GS intercept, 
could be very useful as a ‘safety net’ in case reduced wake vortex separation is applied in the 
airport environment. A single runway arrival procedure for aircraft equipped with a WV DWA 
system assumes that a missed approach is initiated after the flight crew receives an alert 
indicating that the aircraft will likely encounter a severe wake vortex. This study has now also 
quantified wake vortex risk through the use of the WAVIR methodology, extended with an 
aircraft/pilot missed approach model and a causal model for DWA system failure probability.  
 
The assessment of wake induced risk levels for the approach phase when reduced aircraft 
separation (2.0 or 2.5 NM between all aircraft) is applied has been performed for different 
aircraft types and various wind conditions. Aspects considered are e.g. the time for caution and 
alert and the I-Wake system capabilities (such as the horizontal and vertical scanning view, the 
angle of regard, the wake vortex detection range). Further main factors considered are: 
 If one or more WV DWA system components provide a wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might be 
CATASTROPHIC, in case reduced aircraft separation (e.g. 2.0. or 2.5 NM) is applied. 
 The pilot has to initiate a wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case a WV DWA 
warning/alert is raised. Usually, the pilot will initiate a missed approach and/or turn away 
from the wake vortices detected by a WV DWA system on-board the aircraft. 
 The separation distance between leader and follower varies along the approach, and after 
missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and follower increases.  
 
The use of a WV DWA seems to reduce the wake vortex induced risk only slightly as compared 
to the current practice. The main reason for this is the fact that the largest risk during single 
runway arrivals occurs near the runway threshold [1, 2, 7]. Therefore, WV DWA use would be 
most beneficial at low altitudes, where the probability of encountering a (rebounding) wake 
vortex is highest. However, for wake vortex safety reasons the initiation of a missed approach is 
not recommendable at low altitudes. Therefore, the operational use of a WV DWA system 
seems to have only minor impact on the wake vortex induced risk during single runway arrivals. 
This confirms that a WV DWA system is mainly applicable as safety net in support of ATC 
decided reduced separation. 
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